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FOREWORD
In October 1995, the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam
University, in partnership with the Defense Nuclear Agency and
The Korea Society, hosted in Seoul, Korea, an international
workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance. For nearly a half century, the
security alliance between the ROK and the United States has
deterred aggression, helped assure stability in Northeast Asia,
and supported the ROK's political and economic emergence as one
of the advanced democratic industrial countries of the world.
In this monograph, originally presented at the workshop,
Professor Wang Fei-ling examines the future of the alliance from
China's perspective. He suggests that China's current
preoccupation with its domestic agenda and relatively
conservative foreign policy seek to maintain the status quo in
Northeast Asia. And that status quo makes even continued U.S.
military presence desirable in the context of a divided Korea
because it buttresses stability and inhibits militarism in Japan.
But an American presence that grows, takes on the flavor of
containment, or emphasizes human rights and the enlargement of
democracy threatens Chinese security interests. Overall, concern
that Northeast Asia is on the verge of significant transformation
in economics, governments, and balance of power relationships
lends an inevitable duality to Chinese attitudes toward the
Washington-Seoul relationship.
Dr. Wang's comments provide insight into China's probable
reaction to various scenarios of change possible in the next
decade. The Sino-American relationship will become increasingly
important, and Dr. Wang's warning that a sharp shift in China's
Korea policy is possible has significant implications for U.S.
interests. Accordingly, this monograph warrants careful
consideration.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
To understand China's foreign policy in the 1990s and the
true attitude of Beijing towards the military presence of the
United States in Northeast Asia, one must examine China's
perception of the alliance between the United States and the
Republic of Korea (ROK). Public statements aside, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) has shifted its traditional position and
has tacitly accepted, even welcomed, the continuation of the
U.S.-ROK alliance. Beijing views the institutionalized presence
of the Americans in Northeast Asia as a stabilizing force,
serving China's interest of maintaining the favorable status quo
in the region. However, continued acceptance is not guaranteed;
developments in the Sino-American relationship and the course of
reunification of the Korean Peninsula will affect attitudes in
the future.
In order to discuss China's perception of the U.S.-Korean
alliance, let us first examine China's general post-Cold War
security policy, especially regarding Northeast Asia. As the
century ends, Beijing, increasingly preoccupied with its own
domestic agenda, has adopted a more conservative attitude (nearterm) in Northeast Asia. In the post-Cold War era, international
competition has shifted from the political and military to the
economic arena. In this new mileau, Beijing displays a changed,
even ambivalent, attitude towards the United States' political
and military presence in Northeast Asia. American ground forces
in Japan and South Korea and U.S. naval presence in the Western
Pacific have now generally disappeared from China's list of
complaints. Indeed, the United States is frequently regarded as a
stabilizing force in the region, although Beijing watches
carefully Washington's "hegemonic" moves.
The future of the political division on the Korean Peninsula
is naturally of key importance to China's perception of the
U.S.-ROK alliance. One can hardly observe much eagerness on
China's part for a rapid reunification of Korea, although Beijing
is somewhat sincere in supporting the idea of letting the Koreans
themselves control the reunification process. To Beijing, a
stable, peaceful and (hopefully) friendly, but perhaps divided,
Korean Peninsula is more desirable than rapid reunification or a
de-nuclearization of North Korea. Finally, as a result of China's
overall security considerations, Beijing now appears to have
quietly accepted the U.S.-ROK alliance as a part of the favorable
status quo in Northeast Asia. Continued tacit acceptance,
however, is not guaranteed. From the Chinese perspective, there
seems to be an inherent conflict between a united Korea and a
strong Korean- American alliance; if a united Korea maintains an
alliance with the United States, Beijing may have to make a sharp
policy shift. The key variables affecting China's perception of
the U.S.-ROK alliance in the future, therefore, seem to be the
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overall Sino-American relationship and the development of the
inter-Korean relationship.
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TACIT ACCEPTANCE AND WATCHFUL EYES:
BEIJING'S VIEWS ABOUT THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
The Chinese View of Post-Cold War Northeast Asia.
Amidst the jubilation at the end of the Cold War, many
Americans believed that the new, post-Cold War world would be
more uncertain, and even more dangerous, than the previous
decades.1 Similarly, the Chinese entered this new era with mixed
feelings. On the one hand, Beijing publicly stated that a
peaceful, golden era had arrived for China to modernize itself.
On the other hand, a new transitional, multipolar world seemed to
carry with it so many potential security threats and
uncertainties that China should be vigilantly wary of any new
hegemonic behavior on the part of other powers.2 Thus, while
relaxing in a secure post-Cold War world, "the most relaxed
security posture since World War II,"3 and seeking economic gains
over political influence abroad, Beijing continues to watch
carefully for potential security threats to its domestic
political stability and its reunification of the Motherland.
China appears to be playing a subtle, yet familiar, balance
of power game "with Chinese characters," aiming at preventing in
the region expanded U.S. dominance or Japanese military
resurgence, either of which would be viewed by Beijing as a major
security threat. China's actions during the recent North Korean
nuclear dispute demonstrate such an attitude. From that
perspective, the PRC has behaved like a typical status quo power
in Northeast Asia, and its foreign policy is expected to be
rather conservative in the near future.
Even before the demise of the former Soviet Union and the
sharp decline of Russian power, China started to reevaluate its
security environment with a heavy emphasis on "reconfiguration"
and competitions of "comprehensive national power" (zonghe guoli)
among the nations. The Chinese view of the world shifted from
emphasizing the "hegemonic struggle" between the superpowers to
focusing on "peace and development" in a multipolar world.
Motivated by domestic needs and forced by the negative
international responses to its handling of the 1989 Tiananmen
Incident, Beijing adopted Deng Xiaoping's famous "sixteencharacter" low profile approach in international relations.
Chinese analysts now believe that an emerging "multipolarity
helps stability and prosperity," at least in the Asia-Pacific
region.4 They regard "the co-existence of China, Japan, Russia,
and the United States without confrontation between them (as)
something historically unprecedented."5 Northeast Asia is now
considered the most stable region in the post-Cold War world. A
leading foreign policy adviser wrote recently that China enjoys
"the best external environment since the establishment of the
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Peoples' Republic"; Beijing can now rightfully expect a
"politically stable and economically fast-growing" Northeast Asia
that is largely free from the danger of military conflicts.6
Another Chinese researcher observed, "It is the first time that
China has faced no direct military threat since 1949, possibly
since the Opium War of 1840"; thus, "(g)enerally speaking, China
is satisfied with its current security environment."7 Most of the
past security threats have largely gone and many of the old
issues have been rather satisfactorily addressed.8 Whatever long
range security objectives or diplomatic ambitions they may have
in Northeast and Southeast Asia, China's leaders appear to
believe that time is on their side.
To Beijing, domestic political stability is the top security
priority, and a stable and relaxed international security
environment is indispensable to that goal.9 Domestic political
stability for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests, albeit
indirectly, on rapid economic development. Therefore, economic
programs may take precedence over military and diplomatic goals.
At the 14th Congress of the CCP in 1992, Jiang Zemin called for
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to "consciously subordinate
itself to the overall interests of national economic
development."10
A key component in that economic development is East Asia.
In 1992, China's trade with the region comprised nearly twothirds of its total foreign trade.11 Chinese trade with East Asia
grows at a higher than average rate (23 percent in 1991 compared
to 17.6 percent growth overall).12 Japan has been one of China's
largest trade partners (surpassing even Hong Kong in 1993)13 and a
major source of technology and capital. The PRC-ROK economic
relationship got a big boost in 1992 when the two established
full diplomatic relations; the bilateral trade volume in 1991-92
jumped 56 percent14 and has scored an average annual growth rate
of 37 percent for the past three years. In 1994, the PRC-ROK
trade reached an all-time high of US $11.66 billion (US $7.7
billion the first half of 1995).15 Seoul expects China, now its
third largest trading partner, to become its largest by the year
2000.16 China has already become the largest recipient of the
ROK's foreign investment; by the end of 1993, South Korea had
invested in 2,332 Chinese projects, worth US $2.13 billion. The
Chinese also established about 40 projects in the ROK worth US
$11 million.17 Since 1992, Beijing has also largely transformed
its former economic "assistance" to North Korea into a rather
profitable trade relationship.18
A second major Chinese security concern in East Asia is the
reunification of China. Ever since the CCP took power in 1949,
Taiwan has been a security problem to Beijing, both real and
imagined. Sometimes the PRC has appeared over-sensitive, fearing
that a foreign intervention would encourage Taiwan's drive for
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independence, and thus directly endanger China's territorial
integrity and national security. On the one hand, to reunite the
Motherland is viewed as a mandate of history that must not be
compromised. Beijing's sole legitimate rule over China must not
be challenged. On the other hand, a foreign-backed, independent
Taiwan is likely to compel Beijing to use force to bring it under
control, thus leading to a costly military conflict which would
drain funds needed for modernization. Actually, to Beijing,
Taiwan would not have been such a problem had there not been
foreign forces involved, beginning with Japan's annexation of the
island nearly 100 years ago.19 Therefore, as Qian Qichan has
noted, Beijing "does not have any room for maneuver" on the
Taiwan issue because this is directly related to the fundamental
interest of the Chinese nation, and this issue has been the most
important obstacle to the smooth development of the Sino-American
relationship.20 The recent Sino-American conflict over the visit
of Taiwan's president, Lee Tung-Hui, to his American alma mater
(Cornell University) illustrates Beijing's sensitivity and
concern over the possibility of foreign involvement in its
dispute with Taipei. As long as Taipei restrains its ambition of
independence, however, Beijing appears not to be in a hurry to
reunify rapidly, perhaps violently.21
In short, Beijing now is cautious about any new developments
which may alter the status quo in East and Northeast Asia. From a
geopolitical perspective, the United States and Japan are the
only two world-class players who could cause new security
concerns for China in this region, by means of a dominant U.S.
power pursuing "hegemonic" policies there and an rearmed
aggressive Japan. Beijing might feel very insecure, for
historically justifiable reasons, if it had to accede to American
domination or Japanese leadership. The PRC also worries deeply
about potential support for Taiwan's drive for independence from
a still powerful United States or from a Japan restored to
political/military power. Either could jeopardize any diplomatic
goals China may have for the future. Therefore, veiled comments
by leading Chinese military strategists that "hegemonism of the
superpower(s) is still the long-term threat to the regional
security" and may pose new security challenges to the PRC in the
future hint that the "competing United States and Japan" are
those "superpowers" or "regional superpowers."22 Although Japan
now is a friendly neighbor and the United States is basically
viewed as a stabilizing power in Northeast Asia, Beijing
nonetheless plays a subtle, yet familiar, game of "using
barbarians against barbarians" (yiyi zhiyi) against a perceived,
developing threat. Aiming at "preventing the situation in which a
major power dominates the region,"23 China hopes to "take a
neutral stance towards the conflicts among the United States,
Japan and Russia" because it is desirable "for China to maintain
an equilibrium among America, Japan and Russia."24
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The Chinese Policy Towards the U.S. Presence<R>in Northeast Asia.
From the end of the Korean War until the 1980s, Beijing was
always a very strong critic of the American military presence in
South Korea and Japan. Such rhetoric was especially harsh when
the possibility of renewed military confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula erupted or when incidents occurred that might escalate
into conflicts between the United States and North Korea. Beijing
labeled TEAM SPIRIT exercises "provocative," "aggressive," or
"imperialistic" actions. Starting in the 1970s, however, Beijing
began to tone down its criticisms of stationing in Japan American
forces whose strategic objective was to counter the former Soviet
Union. It did continue its criticism of the U.S.-ROK alliance,
mainly because of its own alliance with Pyongyang.
By the end of 1989, however, the world had changed. Beijing
witnessed the sudden collapse of the mighty Soviet Empire with
complicated feelings and deep emotions.25 The disappearance, at
least for the time being, of China's Number One Threat to the
north altered much of its security picture in Northeast Asia.
Potential security threats were now more likely from different
sources, such as the United States and Japan.
China's fear of a restoration of Japanese political
leadership and military power weighs much more heavily.
Prevention of a new Japanese militarism is now a high security
priority of Beijing.26 The Chinese press has always been very
watchful on any signs that might suggest a restoration of
militarism in Japan. Every August Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)
ridicules and criticizes Japanese officials who pay their
"homage" to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.27 During the highly
publicized 50th anniversary celebration of V-J Day in August
1995, China's top leaders all condemned the Japanese refusal to
make sincere apologies and draw "the lessons of history." To most
of the ordinary Chinese, what the Japanese did to China half a
century ago is a horrendous crime that cannot be forgiven. A
strong anti-Japanese sentiment is still easily observed in China
today. China's leaders still call upon its people to "never
forget" Japanese war crimes.28 The Chinese openly regarded
Tokyo's "Official Resolution on World War II" (passed by the
Japanese Diet in June of 1995) as being far from a sincere
apology and, thus, yet another example of the influence of
powerful "right-wing" forces in Japan which seek to "cover up the
past."29 Like the Koreans, Beijing always responds quickly to any
comments by Japanese officials that may be interpreted as
"revising" history and glossing over Japan's past militarism and
aggression. Chinese military leaders have expressed strong doubts
about Tokyo's intentions in post-Cold War East Asia. They believe
that Japan's ability to project power must be monitored
carefully.30 As Jiang Zemin stated publicly in September 1995,
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China must keep "severe criticisms and high vigilance" towards
the possible restoration of the Japanese militarism.31 Although
one may interpret Beijing's criticisms of Japan as a convenient
excuse for its own military growth, China's fear of a militarilypowerful Japan appears genuine and deep.32
Having lost a major balancing power in Northeast Asia with
the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with addressing
Japan's need to possess secure sea lanes without allowing Tokyo
to have a mighty military machine, Beijing genuinely, but
quietly, prefers a continuation of the American military presence
in the region, mainly in Japan and South Korea. China now seems
to have accepted the notion that Washington can be a credible
balancing force to stop Japan's possible (and dangerous)
leadership aspirations in East Asia. Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen, for example, stated publicly in 1993 that traditionally,
in principle, China does not support any major power stationing
its troops abroad. But, the issue (of American military presence
in Japan and South Korea) is a legacy of the past and needs to be
solved gradually.33 Beijing's criticism of the American military
presence in Japan, South Korea and the Western Pacific have all
but disappeared. Despite domestic, anxiety-provoking calls for a
reduction of American military force in Asia, Beijing actually
expects the United States to retain forces in East Asia in the
"short and medium-term."34 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which
they believe will remain in effect at least until early in the
next century, will continue to restrain any significant growth of
the Japanese military power. China thus regards the United States
as a "less harmful devil," which it can "use" to suppress Japan's
desires for military power and political leadership. To achieve
that goal, Beijing tacitly approves the American military
presence in the whole West Pacific.
The Two Koreas in the Eyes of Beijing.
The Chinese have had a deep and unique feeling about the
Koreans. The close relationship resulting from the tributary
system linked the two for more than one thousand years. Under its
Confucian, family-like "international" system, China historically
repressed Korean independence, but rarely intervened in Korean
domestic affairs. Despite the fact that Korea was China's
tributary nation for centuries, very few Chinese really believed
that Korea was ever a part of "China," as opposed to their
attitude toward Tibet, Xinjiang or even Mongolia. For more than
500 years, threatened by Japanese piracy and military aggression,
Korea's security was tied to that of China; that ended when China
failed to save the Yi dynasty from Korean peasants and the
Japanese military in 1895-1896. That loss directly led to the
downfall of the Chinese Empire itself. Never-theless, the close
bonds of history and culture remained.
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That bond seemed especially close between the PRC and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), linked (it would
appear) by a common devotion to Leninist-Stalinist communism and
a shared experience fighting the Japanese in World War II. That
bond grew even stronger when the Korean War pitted the two
directly against the United States and its allies. For
historical, ideological, geopolitical, and strategic reasons,
therefore, Beijing called the North Koreans "comrades and
brothers," who shared a "unbreakable friendship cemented with
blood" and tested by time.35 Other than the occasional, but
generally discreet, conflict, such as North Korea's alleged
territorial demands and Pyongyang's annoying vacillation between
competitors Moscow and Beijing, Kim Il-Sun remained the sole,
lasting communist comrade of Beijing throughout the Cold War. In
the 1990s, after the collapse of the former USSR, China became
North Korea's main supplier of most goods, including food and
energy. Even by the mid-1990s, when the DPRK suffered huge
defaults in trade payments, Beijing continued to supply
Pyongyang.36 The PRC apparently hoped that the DPRK could be
economically more sustainable and, thus, "have a positive
influence in safeguarding peace and stability on the Peninsula"
by pursuing Chinese-style economic reforms and opening up
society. The establishment of the Najin-Sonbong Free Economic
Zone (NSFEZ) in North Korea was, therefore, highly regarded by
the Chinese press.37 A border thoroughfare was reopened in the
Fall of 1995 to allow the Chinese merchants in Jilin Province
easier access to the NSFEZ across the Tumen River.38 Beijing
generally traditionally refrains from commenting on the domestic
affairs of the DPRK other than praising the "eternal friendship"
between Beijing and Pyongyang and offering needed assistance.
Beijing's attitude toward South Korea has not been totally
hostile. Notwithstanding the fact that the ROK was an enemy of
the PRC during the Korean War and the entire Cold War era,
Beijing has always believed, or pretended to believe, that the
South Koreans were somehow victims themselves, pawns of American
aggression. Other than the "handful of Korean reactionaries
controlled" by the United States, China never actively disliked
the ROK--as it did some "walking dogs" of the former USSR and the
United States. Indeed, some small practices have even been used
to prove continued detente. The fact that South Korea,
paradoxically perhaps, kept more Chinese characters in its
language than the DPRK has often been used by many in China as
evidence to show the bonds and friendship between China and the
ROK. Seoul's "economic miracle" in the 1970s and 1980s greatly
altered China's view of the ROK. When China started its own
economic reform, South Korea became a major source of practical
"lessons-learned," as well as concrete "foreign assistance."39
Their rapidly-growing bilateral cooperation has now extended even
to sensitive, high-tech areas such as nuclear power projects.
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Seoul is reported to have successfully signed contracts to build
nuclear reactors for China by mid-1995.40 South Korea is now
generally regarded by the Chinese government and people as an
admirable and friendly neighbor that is determined, prosperous,
reasonable, and cooperative. In the balance-of-power game aimed
at the Japanese and the Americans, both Koreas are generally
considered to be in the same camp as the Chinese. Beijing
believes that all three share victimization by America's annoying
"human rights" policies in Asia; Washington's notion of human
rights, its advocates argue, is undesirable and offensive
throughout the whole East Asian region.41
By most criteria, the DPRK is a major victim of the ending
of the Cold War, while the ROK emerged a major winner. Thus,
Pyongyang's fear for its own political survival and its self-help
efforts (including its nuclear ambitions) seem reasonable, even
justifiable, to the PRC leaders. China does not strive for the
success of one over the other; instead, it has worked to achieve
an overall balance and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Thus,
while it increases its political and, especially, economic ties
with the ROK, it maintains the stability of the DPRK. This
Chinese-style, balance-of-power strategy in Northeast Asia was
clearly illustrated by Beijing's policy towards the North Korean
nuclear issue. The stability of the status quo on the Peninsula,
not a decisive American victory over the DPRK, seems to be the
goal of the PRC. The subsequent development of the North Korean
nuclear issue appears, so far, to satisfy China since Pyongyang
agreed to stop its nuclear program, while the United States and
the ROK began to inject much needed resources to stabilize the
Kim Jong-Il regime.42
To deter the possible restoration of Japanese militarism and
cope with a resurgent United States forcefully advocating its
version of human rights and political democracy in Northeast
Asia, in the absence of credible Russian power, China is likely
to continue its balance-of-power strategy on the Korean
Peninsula, supporting a "separate but equal" policy in the near
term. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese press has spent equal
time reporting the activities and exchanges between the PRC and
each of the two Koreas. A closer look reveals that the greatest
activities between the PRC and the ROK, however, have been mainly
in the areas of economy, while the officially-reported, frequent
exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang have largely been visits
of officials and former Chinese "Volunteers." China would have
the maximum strategic leverage on the Peninsula if the two Koreas
were peacefully co-existing, but separated. Li Ruihuan, a top CCP
leader, told the visiting ROK politician, Kim Tae-Chung, in the
Fall of 1995, that,
China hopes that the Korean Peninsula would maintain
peace and stability, . . . (thus to allow) both the
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south and north sides of the Korean Peninsula to create
a favorable atmosphere for the final realization of
peaceful reunification.43
Like many Koreans themselves in the ROK, Beijing does not
wish for a rapid reunification of Korea at the expenses of the
stability and strategic maneuverability of the status quo. Rapid
reunification of the Peninsula is not a certainty for, as some
Chinese scholars believe, it would require a major political
change in North Korea.44 Nevertheless, for obvious reasons,
Beijing does not want to see its Northeastern provinces
overwhelmed by a refugee flood caused by a sudden collapse of the
Pyongyang regime.45 As one analyst noted,
reunification without incurring instability will serve
the interests of all parties concerned. Copying of the
"German model" is not realistic . . . (and) it is
difficult to confine the instability in the North
(Korea) to North only.46
Furthermore, as South Korean scholars observed, Korean
reunification will likely reduce the American presence in East
Asia and "greatly increase" the Japanese influence which is not
in the interest of the PRC.47 Other than strengthening itself in
the global "competition of comprehensive national power," China
will constantly search for buffer zones and counter-weights
against major powerful competitors like Japan and the United
States.48 The long-time "comrades" in Pyongyang and the rich,
vigorous, friendly and very "Asian" ROK would be of great help in
executing this strategy, for they, too, share this fear of Japan.
Indeed, the PLA noted in 1994 that Seoul has now put Japan ahead
of the PRC and DPRK as a potential security threat.49
Chinese Perception of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.
Traditionally, the PRC feels insecure and often reacts
forcefully to any neighbor's military alliance with a major
"external" power. The costly war China waged against Vietnam in
1979 was clearly motivated, to a great extent, by its fear of the
Vietnamese-USSR alliance formed a year earlier.50 The U.S.-ROK
alliance was for a long time viewed by Beijing as a hegemonic, if
not straightforward imperialist, tool of Washington to control
East Asia. U.S. nuclear forces and the TEAM SPIRIT exercises were
the main targets of Beijing's criticisms.
But, China's perception began to change as it started its
internal reforms, a process which accelerated as the Cold War
drew to an end. Beijing began to gradually and quietly accept
(and even like) the U.S.-ROK alliance for its utility in
stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and constraining the Japanese.
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But, China's continued tacit acceptance of the alliance is not
guaranteed. China's perception appears to be conditioned by
overall Sino-American relations, Beijing's own regional security
interests, and the interactions between the two Koreas.
Current international relations in Northeast Asia are built
around the "quadrangular" relationship between the United States,
Japan, China and Russia.51 Their improved relationship may have
directly contributed to the political detente and increased
economic contacts between the two Koreas since late 1980s. The
likelihood of a new war between the two Koreas, thus, has
declined. China now is on the best terms in over a century with
the other three great powers and feels an immediate security
threat from none of them. Better still for the Chinese, "(a)mong
the four powers (United States, Russia, Japan and China), China
is the only country that currently has good relations with both
North and South Koreas."52
This historically unprecedented situation increases Chinese
confidence and gives it more room to maneuver in Northeast Asia.
The fast-growing economic tie between Seoul and Beijing form a
solid base for the PRC-ROK relationship. The 34-year-old "SinoKorean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance"
serves as a formal alliance between China and the DPRK. In such a
situation, the U.S.-ROK alliance (including its military
component) seems significantly less threatening to China's
national security. Since the military alliance between Seoul and
Washington is a major component of the favorable status quo
Beijing now enjoys in Northeast Asia, it is not a surprise to see
that China now rarely mentions, let alone objects to, the U.S.ROK alliance.
Tacit acceptance does not mean public endorsement, however.
The PRC's version of international ethics, including its
prohibition on stationing troops on foreign soil and its standing
commitments to Pyongyang, prevent Beijing from openly praising
such a military alliance. Tacit acceptance also does not keep
Beijing from censuring American actions. Washington is often
publicly criticized for still operating in the "Cold War mode,"
e.g., using rhetoric assailing "communists," including
(naturally) the CCP.53 Some in Beijing reproach Washington and the
American press for retaining a "Cold War Syndrome" or "hegemonic
psychology" that twists U.S. foreign policy and poisons the SinoAmerican relationship.54 Beijing may now empathize with
Pyongyang's feeling of being "cornered" by the United States
after the Cold War. "Aftereffects of the Cold War,"55 such as
using economic sanctions to destabilize ideological enemies, may
indeed look like an American attempt to "roll back" the Korean
Peninsula--something the Chinese would definitely be alarmed by.
The increasingly chilling atmosphere between Beijing and
Washington since 1989 only deepens China's suspicion of the
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United States' real intention in East Asia. Some Chinese analysts
openly argue that the United States sees China as "the main
target of Westernization," implying that Washington could be
working to undermine the political stability of the PRC.56 The
recent disputes over Taiwan have led many Chinese to argue that
Washington may have become a right wing- dominated, aggressive
power that seeks to weaken--even destroy--the PRC.
Beijing watches carefully the potential security threat
from a resurgent United States. Many Chinese analysts believe,
therefore, that the Korean Peninsula is potentially an arena for
renewed struggle between the United States and the PRC. As one
analyst noted,
The Korean Peninsula issue is no longer a simple
dispute between South and North Korea; the different
attitudes of China and United States on the North
Korean nuclear issue are, essentially speaking, a
strategic trial of strength between the two countries
on the Korean Peninsula.57
A resurgent United States threatens to limit the influence of
China in the post-Cold War World.
The United States . . . wants to contain China,
regarding China's unification, development, and growing
strength as 'potential threats' to the American
hegemony . . . because the United States does not have
a sufficient understanding of the accelerating trend
towards multipolarization in the post-Cold War world.58
China's attitude towards the U.S.-ROK alliance ebbs and
flows with the U.S.-PRC relationship. When relations with
Washington are cordial, Beijing can tacitly accept the alliance.
But, if Beijing suspects that Washington is using its military
ties with Seoul to pursue its "hegemonic" policies in East Asia,
e.g., to limit China's options in the South China Sea or in
Taiwan, Beijing could easily lean toward the DPRK's position and
make the U.S.-ROK alliance a major issue in Sino-American and
PRC-ROK relations. China could substantially strengthen its own
alliance with North Korea and more overtly encourage the
belligerence of Pyongyang.
Beijing fears that if the United States is allowed to have
its way every time in Northeast Asia, it could eventually
dominate the region, much like the situation in the Caribbean. In
such a case, Beijing would find itself in a very poor security
environment given its determination to sustain its political
system and reunify the country. American dominance in East Asia,
although unlikely at the moment, appears to be a major long-term
concern to Beijing, which will continually factor in Beijing's
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attitudes toward the U.S.-ROK alliance.
By the mid-1990s, when the PRC seemed to have shifted its
immediate military attention to Southeast Asia, particularly to
the South China Sea islands and to the Taiwan Straits,59 the U.S.ROK alliance was still viewed as a stabilizing mechanism, thus
acceptable and even favorable to Beijing, that ensured that no
security problems would arise in Northeast Asia to disturb the
Chinese actions in the south. Whether Washington would (or could)
use those U.S. forces in South Korea to intervene against
possible Chinese military actions in the south, such as a naval
blockade against Taiwan, remains a major security concern to the
Chinese.
A strong U.S.-ROK alliance may indeed contribute to a new
American containment strategy against China and, thus, affect
China's future pursuits and options. As one Chinese analyst
recently concluded,
It is impossible that China will lie there motionless
forever (as Napoleon allegedly suggested almost two
hundred years ago). The 1.2 billion Chinese people, who
are their own masters, want to develop and move on.
This is a historical trend that nobody can hold back. .
. . The "theory of containing China" will not get much
popular support and is doomed to failure.60
Another major variable affecting China's perception of the
U.S.-ROK alliance is the inter-Korean relationship. In order to
preserve the favorable status quo in Northeast Asia, Beijing is
reluctant to endure a "crash unification" of North and South
Korea (similar to that experienced by the two Germanies) or U.S.
military-backed international sanctions that could provoke a new
war on the Peninsula.61 An important factor in Beijing's
calculation about the U.S.-ROK alliance may be its desire to
"protect" its North Korean comrades. Ever since the end of the
Cold War, Beijing has expressed disappointment and unhappiness
over the U.S. and Japanese decisions not to establish full
diplomatic relations with Pyongyang--long after Moscow and
Beijing recognized Seoul. According to Chinese press and
academia, American behavior towards North Korea in the 1990s
actually matches quite well the Chinese description of "hegemonic
power," a buzzword for security threat and international enemy.
With a different agenda, perspective, and perhaps intelligence
collection, Beijing naturally does not share as deeply American
concerns over Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons and a
potential, explosive southward invasion from the DPRK. Beijing
easily deems active American actions in South Korea as
"unnecessary" and "hegemonic" moves that may actually harm
Chinese interests. Unless there is continued, further improvement
of the U.S.-DPRK relationship, Beijing will likely be cautiously
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critical about the U.S.-ROK alliance on occasion; the alliancelike close relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is likely
to continue to balance the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Finally, the Chinese perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance is
tightly linked to the issue of Korean reunification. The PRC's
tacit acceptance of the U.S.-ROK alliance apparently is only
valid under the current framework of international relations in
Northeast Asia. Beijing would clearly feel very uncomfortable and
insecure if a united Korea or a unifying Korea maintained an
effective military alliance with the United States.
When jointly considering the U.S.-ROK alliance and the
course of Korean reunification, the PRC appears to have a
hierarchy of preferences. The best scenario would be a nonthreatening U.S.-ROK alliance on the divided, but stable, Korean
Peninsula to maintain the favorable status quo. This is exactly
the current situation after the China-desired solution of the
North Korean nuclear issue. The second choice would be a gradual,
but peaceful, reunification of the two Koreas with an unambiguous
demise of the U.S-ROK alliance--especially its military
components. The PRC may obstruct such a peaceful reunification if
it meant a total disappearance of the DPRK regime. A less
desirable outcome would be a military withdrawal of the United
States from South Korea without a rapid Korean reunification. The
reduction of the American presence would encourage the rise of
Japan, but the divided (yet stable) Korean Peninsula could still
function as a buffer for the PRC. The least desirable situation
would be a rapid Korean reunification of the whole Peninsula with
a continued strong U.S.-ROK alliance, which China would regard as
a direct security threat.
Such a hierarchy of preferences makes the Chinese policy
towards the Korean reunification and the U.S.-ROK alliance a
complex and perplexing one. From the Chinese perspective, there
seems to be a fundamental conflict between accepting a U.S.-ROK
alliance and supporting Korean reunification. This deeply rooted
security concern is likely to make the gap between Beijing's
words and the deeds regarding Northeast Asia more apparent in two
ways. On the one hand, the PRC works to maintain the status quo,
but needs to voice its "full support" to its ally, North Korea,
which at least publicly argues for an immediate American
withdrawal from South Korea. On the other hand, struggling with
its own reunification course, Beijing prefers the U.S.-ROK
alliance and a divided Korea, but is compelled publicly to
"encourage" the drive for Korean reunification (which may result
in a threatening Korean-American alliance covering the whole
Korean Peninsula). The PRC recently, however, has expressed
interest in the possibly changing nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance
from a dependent relationship to a partnership. In addition to
the growing American domestic cries for reducing the U.S.
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security commitment in East Asia, increasingly many Koreans have
argued for a more "democratic" or "equal" partnership between
Seoul and Washington to serve the changed interests of the ROK in
the post-Cold War era.62 Such demands are likely to alter the
nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the years to come following
reunification. The military components of the alliance, for
example, could be significantly reduced, and Seoul might acquire
more control of the alliance. Some in the PLA, for example,
believe changes in such a direction would benefit the region and
the Peninsula,63 since a greater Korean say in the U.S.-ROK
alliance may result in a less-likely American threat.
Conclusion.
China is satisfied with current Northeast Asian
international relations. However, it watches for new threats-mostly likely in the form of an external, dominating power in
East Asia or revived Japanese militarism. Limited by its own
capacity, the PRC is likely to play the old balance of power game
to maintain a favorable status quo. On the Korean Peninsula,
China does not want rapid change or stalemate. Despite China's
suspicions and doubts, the United States is currently viewed by
Beijing as an effective means to maintain the security
arrangement in Northeast Asia. For China's short-term security
objectives, the Americans are welcomed (and even encouraged) to
continue their military presence in South Korea to constrain the
Japanese. But, a United States that aggressively promotes human
rights and political democracy is deeply feared by Beijing as a
long-term challenge to the political stability of the CCP regime.
U.S. policies towards Taiwan, driven by domestic politics, touch
even more sensitive nerves in Beijing. The recent Chinese
taciturn consent to the presence of the Russian naval forces in
the Pacific may indicate that Beijing is preparing an alternative
to American help in balancing Japan. The double security
objective of using and resisting the United States in East Asia
appears to be China's dominant perception of the American
presence in this region in general and the U.S-ROK alliance in
particular.
Beijing accepts and even tacitly likes the U.S.-ROK
alliance, as long as it remains a bilateral alliance with the
simple aim of deterring external aggression against the ROK. The
Chinese Foreign Minister recently (and openly) termed the
formerly much-criticized U.S.-ROK military relationship as merely
something "the Americans are now discussing among themselves."64
That is, it is basically an American and South Korean issue under
the current international structure in Northeast Asia. China
would not mind this alliance at all. Given our understanding of
China's security concerns in East Asia, however, any alteration
of the purpose, content, or scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance would
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necessarily cause Beijing to reassess its position. China accepts
a U.S.-ROK alliance in a divided Korea, but a united Korea with a
continued Korean-American military alliance would be very
undesirable to Beijing. The key variables affecting China's
perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the future, therefore,
seem to be the overall Sino-American relationship and the
development of the inter-Korean relationship.
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